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ABSTRACT
A model-driven design and validation of closed-loop medi-
cal device systems is presented. Currently, few if any med-
ical systems on the market support closed-loop control of
interconnected medical devices, and mechanisms for regu-
latory approval of such systems are lacking. We present a
system implementing a clinical scenario where closed-loop
control may reduce the possibility of human error and im-
prove safety of the patient. The safety of the system is stud-
ied with a simple controller proposed in the literature. We
demonstrate that, under certain failure conditions, safety
of the patient is not guaranteed. Finally, a more complex
controller is described and ensures safety even when failures
are possible. This investigation is an early attempt to intro-
duce automatic control in clinical scenarios and to delineate
a methodology to validate such patient-in-the-loop systems
for safe and correct operation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.3 [Special-Purpose and Application-Based Systems]:
Real-time and embedded systems; D.2.4 [Software/Program
Verification]: Formal methods; D.4.5 [Reliability]: Fault
tolerance; H.3.4 [Systems and Software]: Distributed sys-
tems; J.3 [Life and Medical Sciences]: Medical informa-
tion systems
1. INTRODUCTION
Clinical scenarios for critical care patients often involve
large numbers of medical devices. Some of these devices,
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such as bedside monitors, provide vital information about
the state of the patient. Other devices, for example, in-
fusion pumps, provide treatment. That is, they affect the
state of the patient, for example, by infusing medication.
Medical device systems, considered together with the pa-
tient and caregivers, represent an important class of cyber-
physical systems. Patient safety is the primary concern in
such systems, yet reasoning about patient safety is very dif-
ficult because of insufficient understanding of the dynamics
of human body response to treatment. Human errors, an-
other important source of patient safety problems, are also
difficult to reason about in the framework of conventional
embedded system development.
It is natural to view a clinical scenario as a control system,
in which the patient is a plant, bedside monitors are sensors
and infusion pumps are actuators. Traditionally, caregivers
perform the role of the controller in such a system. This
means that the caregiver needs to continuously monitor all
sensor devices and apply appropriate treatment. The large
number of devices to monitor and control makes the job
of the caregiver very difficult. On top of that, a caregiver
is typically responsible for several patients. An emergency
may divert the caregiver’s attention elsewhere, making him
or her miss an important event. As a result, patient safety
may suffer. Multiple such occurrences are documented in
the clinical literature.
The human caregiver will always play an indispensable
part of most clinical scenarios. However, in many cases au-
tomatic controllers can play important roles, reducing the
burden on the caregiver and avoiding the possibility of hu-
man errors. A number of such cases have been documented
in the ASTM standard for the Integrated Clinical Environ-
ment [1]. The standard has been developed by the Medical
Device Plug-and-Play Interoperability program at the Cen-
ter for Integration of Medicine & Innovative Technology of
the Massachusetts General Hospital (mdpnp.org) [2]. Al-
though many medical devices today have network interfaces
and can send sensed data across the network, few can be con-
trolled remotely. Vendors of medical equipment continue to
stay away from closed-loop scenarios.
The rationale is that it is difficult to reason about patient
safety in closed-loop scenarios. Such reasoning is necessary
for medical devices, which have to be approved for use by
government regulators who assess their safety and effective-
ness. A particular challenge arises from the complexity of a
complex interplay between the continuous dynamics of the
patient reaction to treatment and the discrete nature of the
controller and communication network. The dynamics of the
patient body is not well understood and exhibits parametric
uncertainty and high variability between different patients.
To overcome this difficulty, we explore a model-driven ap-
proach that allows us to prove safety properties of devices on
the modeling level and ensure that abstract models used in
the verification process are sound with respect to the actual
dynamics of the system.
In order to prove properties of the system, we model it
using the formalism of timed automata [3] in the UPPAAL
tool [4]. The model abstracts away continuous dynamics of
the system, replacing it with timing constraints. The values
for the timing constraints are obtained from the continuous
dynamics of system components using the detailed model in
Matlab.
Both the abstract, formal model and the detailed, infor-
mal model are needed in the process of verification, valida-
tion, and regulatory approval of closed-loop medical device
systems. On the one hand, formal models allow us to ex-
haustively explore the possible behaviors of the system and
prove its safety. On the other hand, detailed models allow
us to use high-fidelity simulation that take real system dy-
namics into account. Both kinds of results can be used to
make the case for regulatory approval.
The main contribution of the paper is the methodology for
the analysis of safety properties of closed-loop medical device
systems. While we do not solve the problem in its entirety,
we demonstrate, using a case study, how the methodology
can be applied to a system of clinical importance. In the
case study, we prove that the system is safe under a set
of assumptions. We then demonstrate that a violation of
these assumptions – for example, by a more realistic fault
model – can make the system unsafe. Finally, we propose a
solution to restore the safety of the system under the new
fault model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the medical case study and presents and the sys-
tem architecture of the case study that we used to describe
our approach. Section 3 describes the UPPAAL models of
the system and safety properties we have verified. Section 4
explains the use of Matlab models of the system to analyze
safety with no failure assumption. It then explains modifi-
cations to the system to deal with failures and provides an
argument that the new system is fail-safe. The last section
summarizes the paper and identifies the future work.
2. CASE STUDY
In this section, we describe a case study that represents
one of the MD PnP interoperability clinical scenarios [1]. In
the past, we have built a demonstration of this scenario [5].
Several variants of this system have been presented at the
American Society of Anesthesiologists annual meeting in
2007, where it won first place in the scientific exhibits, at
the 2008 HIMMS (Healthcare Information and Management
Systems Society) Congress, and at the 2008 CIMIT Innova-
tion Congress.
We have built the system according to the Integrated Clin-
ical Environment (ICE) architecture, developed by the MD
PnP project. Figure 1 shows the main components of an
ICE-compliant system. The patient and caregiver are the
human elements of the system. The Supervisor is the com-
puter system that runs the control algorithm. Medical de-
vices are connected, through adapters where necessary, to
the Network Controller, which keeps track of connected de-
vices and their capabilities. The Data Logger records perti-
nent network traffic for later forensic analysis and external
networks such as the hospital information system are con-
nected through an external interface. In our case study, we
did not model the data logger since it does not affect our
runtime safety analysis.
2.1 Clinical Use Case
The selected scenario involves a patient connected to a
patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) infusion pump. PCA in-
fusion pumps are commonly used to deliver opioids for pain
management, for instance after surgery. Patients have very
different reactions to the medications and require very dif-
ferent dosages and delivery schedules. PCA pumps give the
patient a button to press to request a dose when they decide
they want it rather than using a schedule fixed by a care-
giver. Some patients may decide they prefer a higher level
of pain to the nausea the drugs may cause and can press the
button less often, while patients who need a higher dose can
press it more often.
A major problem with opioid medications in general is
that an excessive dose, or overdose, can cause respiratory
failure. A properly programmed PCA system should not al-
low an overdose because it is programmed with limits on how
many doses it will deliver, regardless of how often the button
is pushed. However, this safety mechanism is not sufficient
to protect all patients. Some patients still receive overdoses
if the pump is misprogrammed, if the pump programmer
overestimates the maximum dose a patient can receive, if
the wrong concentration of drug is loaded into the pump, or
if someone other than the patient presses the button (PCA-
by-proxy), among other causes. PCA infusion pumps are
currently involved in a large number of adverse events, and
existing safeguards such as drug libraries and programmable
limits are not adequate to address all the scenarios seen in
clinical practice [6].
The system we are considering aims to improve patient
safety in such a scenario by introducing a supervisor that
monitors patient data for the early signs of respiratory fail-
ure and can stop the infusion and sound an alarm if the
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Figure 2: Hardware for PCA Demo System
patient experiences an adverse event. We use a pulse oxime-
ter device that receives physiological signals from a clip on
the patient’s finger and processes them to calculate heart
rate and SpO2 outputs, where SpO2 is the measure of blood
oxygenation. Note that, at the time of writing, there are
no PCA pumps on the market that are capable of being re-
motely controlled. In the demonstration system, we used
the PCA pump prototype we have built in the past during
the Generic Infusion Pump project [7].
2.2 System Architecture
Figure 2 shows the components of the PCA safety system,
and Figure 3 is a photograph of a demo system built using
these components. The system components are described
below.
Figure 4 shows the devices and essential data flow in this
control loop. The variables in the system are listed in Ta-
ble 1. The pulse oximeter receives physiological signals from
the patient and processes them to produce heart rate and
SpO2 outputs. The Supervisor gets these outputs and makes
a control decision, possibly sending a stop signal to the PCA
Pump. The PCA pump delivers a drug to the patient at
its programmed rate unless it is stopped by the Supervisor.
The patient model gets the drug rate as an input and cal-
culates the level of drug in the patient’s body. This in turn
influences the physiological output signals through a drug
absorption function.
Figure 3: PCA Demo System
source description name
pulse oximeter signal processing time tpo
output HR and SpO2 values hr, SpO2
patient model drug level dl
drug absorption function f(dl)
output physiological signals wf1, wf2
supervisor algorithm processing time tsup
pca pump pump stop delay tstop
infusion rate rate
Table 1: Variables for critical timing loop
PCA Infusion Pump. Patients using a PCA pump are
usually also attached to patient monitors that record the
patient’s EKG, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and SpO2.
These monitors sound alarms if the values they measure are
outside thresholds set by the caregivers, but they do not
stop the infusion. Thus, the patients continue to receive
more of an overdose while the caregiver responds, assesses
the patient, decides whether there is a real problem, and
finally stops the pump.
The pump in our case study operates in the following way.
Before operation, the pump is programmed by the caregiver,
who sets the normal rate of infusion, the increased rate of
a bolus, and bolus duration. Some PCA pumps also can be
programmed to limit the total amount of drug to be infused.
Once programmed and started, the pump delivers the drug
at the normal rate until it is stopped or the bolus button is
pressed. From that moment, it delivers drug at the bolus
rate for the specified duration and then returns to the normal
rate.
The pump is equipped with a number of built-in sensors
that detect internal malfunctions such as the presence of
air in the tubes that deliver the drug. When a problem is
detected, the pump is stopped. We do not consider such
malfunctions in this case study and do not represent the
built-in alarm mechanism.
Finally, the pump is equipped with a network interface,
which allows the pump to transmit its status across the net-
work to other devices such as the logger. For the purpose
of our scenario, we assume that the network interface allows
the pump to accept control signals. A stop control signal
will set the current infusion rate to zero, while the start sig-
nal will set the normal infusion rate (regardless of the state
of the pump before it was stopped).
Pulse Oximeter. In this study, we look at using SpO2
and heart rate measurements as the basis for a physiologic
closed-loop control system that can stop the PCA pump and
halt the dose of opioid while sounding an alarm if respira-
tory distress is detected. Both of these measurements can
be produced by a device called pulse oximeter. This device
is equipped with a finger clip sensor that shines two wave-
lenghts of light through the patient’s finger. The measured
light intensity reflects the blood oxygen content, which can
change rapidly.
last output value new window size
97 - 100 10
94 - 96 8
90 - 93 7
85 - 89 6
< 85 4
Table 2: Sliding Window Size for Pulse Oximeter
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Figure 4: PCA System Control Loop
The pulse oximeter samples the patient’s SpO2 at regular
intervals, processes them, and outputs an averaged result [8].
It calculates the average using a variable-sized sliding win-
dow. The window size varies with the last output value. The
reason for changing the window size is that smaller sample
size gives faster, but potentially less accurate results. When
SpO2 values are low, quick response is more important than
filtering out transient noise. When SpO2 is high, increasing
the window size helps to filter out transient low values at the
expense of less frequent updates. Since the samples are at
regular intervals and a varying number of samples are used
to calculate the output, the output is updated irregularly.
The size of the sliding window that we used in the case study
is determined using a simple table shown in Table 2.2. Note
that this table does not reflect the details of any real im-
plementation but rather attempts to capture the essential
behavior of a typical pulse oximeter.
Patient Model. We use a simple patient model, where the
patient state is characterized by the current drug level. The
state space is partitioned into regions. The patient can be
in pain (under-medicated), pain-controlled (adequate medi-
cation), or over-medicated. If the patient is over-medicated
to the point that he or she starts experiencing respiratory
distress, we consider it an overdose. We refer to the over-
dose condition as the Critical region. Any treatment needs
to make sure that the patient stays out of the critical region,
and we use this requirement as the main safety property of
the system that needs to be ensured. In this case study,
we defined the boundary of the Critical region in terms of
the patient SpO2 and heart rate and set it to H2 = 70%
for SpO2 (and H2 = 11.5 beats/min for heart rate), a clear
indication of respiratory failure.
Our model represents the instantaneous level of medica-
tion in the patient’s body as a single variable. This variable
is linked to the patient’s heart rate and SpO2 by the drug
absorption function, which represents how the patient re-
acts to the dose received over time. Some patients react very
quickly to a dose of drug, while others react more slowly. By
adjusting this function, we can tune the model to different
patient types.
Caregiver Model. The caregiver in this system programs
the PCA pump and reacts to alarms. The control system
is closed loop, so no intervention by the caregiver is neces-
Patient
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CG2PCA_start
CG2PCA_program
S2NW_clearS2NW_stop
resultready
P2PCA_bolus
NW2PCA_stop
NW2PCA_clear
po_result
pca_rate
samplereadysamplebuffer CG2S_clear
Figure 5: Communication structure of the UPPAAL
model
sary to stop the infusion when a problem is detected. The
caregiver can react to restart the system if it has stopped
in reaction to a false alarm, or when a problem such as a
slipped patient sensor is fixed.
Supervisor. The supervisor is a running program in the
system that communicates with other devices and executes
clinical application scripts (CAS’s). A CAS is a script that
implements a particular clinical use case. The clinical ap-
plication in this case study is to control the loop shown in
Figure 4. The Supervisor receives the patient’s heart rate
and SpO2 measurements from the pulse oximeter and uses
this information to decide whether the PCA infusion pump
should be allowed to run or immediately stopped.
In the case study, we designed a simple control algorithm
for the supervisor, in which the decision to stop the pump
is made as soon as the patient heart rate or SpO2 read-
ings fall below a fixed threshold. The choice of threshold
needs to ensure that the patient does not enter the Criti-
cal region despite the delay in detecting the problem and
delivering the control signal to the pump. For the case
study, we defined the threshold as H1 = 90% for the SpO2
and H1 = 57 beats/min for heart rate. Values below these
thresholds typically indicate“a clinical concern”( [9], p. 45),
meaning that a caregiver needs to be notified. The super-
visor notifies the caregiver when the threshold is crossed, as
it sends the message to stop the pump. Values between H1
and H2 are thus referred as the Alarming region. The width
of the alarming region is denoted ΔH =| H2 −H1 |.
3. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF
COMPONENTS AND SYSTEM IN UPPAAL
The structure of the UPPAAL model follows the archi-
tecture of the system. For each component in Figure 2, the
model includes a separate automaton. The automata com-
municate using synchronization channels and shared vari-
ables. Figure 5 shows network of automata and communi-
cation between them. Solid arrows represent communication
channels and dashed arrows represent shared variables.
3.1 UPPAAL Component Models
The PCA automaton, which represents the pump, is shown
in Figure 6. When the pump is operational, it is either in
the state running, with the shared variable pca_rate set
to default rate, or in the state bolusing, when pca_rate is
increased by the bolus rate. Both rates are specified as pa-
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Figure 7: Timed automaton for the pulse oximeter
rameters of the model. The pump can be bolusing for a fixed
duration given by the value of the bolus_time parameter.
The pump transitions to the bolusing state upon the signal
received from the patient only if it is in the running state; in
all other states, the signal is ignored. From either running
or bolusing state, the pump can move to a stopped state
(Rstopped or Bstopped, respectively) upon a signal from the
network.
The PO automaton, which represents the pulse oximeter,
is shown in Figure 7. The operation of the automaton pro-
ceeds in rounds. Each round begins by setting the window
size for the round based on the last sampled value. Then,
the automaton collects the number of samples to fill the win-
Rstopped
Bstopped
bolusing
bolus_clock <= bolus_time
running
programmed
on
P2PCA_bolus ?
pca_rate := pca_rate + bolus_rate,
bolus_clock := 0
NW2PCA_clear ?
NW2PCA_clear ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
NW2PCA_clear ?
pca_rate := default_ratebolus_clock >= bolus_time
pca_rate := default_rate
NW2PCA_clear ?
pca_rate := default_rate
NW2PCA_stop ?
pca_rate := 0
NW2PCA_stop ?
pca_rate := 0
CG2PCA_start ?
pca_rate := default_rate
CG2PCA_programmed ?
Figure 6: Timed automaton for the PCA pump
dow. Samples are obtained periodically with the interval of
1 time unit, which corresponds to 100 ms. Finally, the re-
sult is stored in the po_result variable and delivered to the
supervisor using the resultready channel.
The Supervisor automaton, shown in Figure 8, imple-
ments the simple control algorithm. Upon receiving a SpO2
reading from the pulse oximeter, the supervisor compares
it with the pre-defined threshold value and, if the result is
too low, sends the stop message to the pump across the net-
work. The model also incorporates a delay, which represents
the worst-case execution time of the supervisor algorithm.
Then, once the caregiver resolves the problem, the supervi-
sor sends another message to restart the pump. For simplic-
ity of the presentation, the Supervisor automaton only deals
with SpO2, not heart rates.
The Patient automaton, shown in Figure 9, periodically
updates the drug level based on the flow rate of the pump
and drug absorption rate. At any time, it can deliver a
sample as the function of the current drug level.
The network automaton in Figure 10 implements a two-
place buffer, which means that there may be two network
messages in transit. The stop message may be dropped by
the network, if the boolean parameter drop is set to true. We
do not model dropping of the restart message, since the loss
of these messages does not affect the safety of the patient. If
messages are not dropped, they are delivered by the network
in order. The caregiver automaton, not shown here, contains
one state and can send any of the messages at any time.
A more detailed model of the caregiver may include data-
dependent behaviors, for example, the clear signal may be
sent only if the SpO2 reading is high enough. However, any
po_choice
pump_cleared
s_clock <= s_delay
pump_stopped
waiting_for_result
po_result >= spo2_threshold
po_result < spo2_threshold
s_clock := 0
resultready?
local_spo2 := po_result
S2NW_clear !
CG2S_clear ?
s_clock >= s_delay
S2NW_stop!
Figure 8: Timed automaton for the supervisor
other model will have fewer behaviors than the caregiver
model used here, and thus the safety property will still hold.
3.2 Verifying PCA System Safety Properties
The main safety property that needs to be verified on the
UPPAAL model is whether or not the patient can enter the
Critical region, where SpO2 and heart rate are low enough
to indicate a respiratory arrest. Before verifying safety, how-
ever, we perform several auxiliary checks to ensure sanity of
the model.
We express properties we verify in the subset of the Com-
putational Tree Logic (CTL) [10] used by UPPAAL. The
main temporal operators of this logic are Aφ, which means
that φ is satisfied in every state along every execution path
from the current state, and Aφ, meaning that φ is satisfied
eventually along every path.
The first sanity check is the absence of deadlocks in the
model. Another sanity check is that once the SpO2 level
goes below the pain threshold, it eventually goes up. This
property is captured by the temporal logic formula
A(samplebuffer < pain thresh ⇒
A  samplebuffer ≥ pain thresh). (1)
Note that the property is defined in terms of the true SpO2
level as defined by the patient model, not the sensor reading
obtained by the supervisor. Intuitively, this property should
hold, because the normal infusion rate is lower than the drug
absorption rate and, once the patient stops requesting new
boluses and the last bolus infusion is over, drug level will
start decreasing and thus SpO2 and heart rate levels should
increase, until they reach pain threshold again. Finally, we
check that the pump is stopped if the patient ever enters the
alarming region. Formally,
A(samplebuffer < alarm thresh ⇒
A  (PCA.Rstopped ∨ PCA.Bstopped)). (2)
We consider this property to be a sanity check rather than a
safety requirement, because wrong parameters of the model
start
p_clock <= 1
sampleready !
samplebuffer := 100 - drug_level
drug_level < pain_thresh
P2PCA_bolus !
drug_level := drug_level +pca_rate >= ab_rate ?
        drug_level + pca_rate - ab_rate : 0,
p_clock := 0
drug_level >= pain_thresh
drug_level := drug_level 
                + pca_rate - ab_rate,
p_clock := 0
p_clock >= 1
Figure 9: Timed automaton for the patient
SC
stop_clock <= OD_delay
CS
clear_clock <= OD_delay
S
stop_clock <= OD_delay
C
clear_clock <= OD_delay
E
drop
S2NW_stop ?
drop
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_stop!
clear_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_clear !
stop_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_stop !
clear_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_clear !
S2NW_clear ?
clear_clock := 0
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock := 0
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock := 0
S2NW_clear ?
clear_clock := 0
Figure 10: Timed automaton for the network
– for example, too short bolus duration or too high drug
absorption rate – can make the system appear safe (that
is, SpO2 level never goes too low), but it would be safe
for the wrong reason. All sanity checks were passed by the
UPPAAL model described above when no dropped messages
are allowed. Clearly, property (2) does not hold if messages
can be dropped.
Finally, we turn to checking the main safety property.
With the threshold for the Critical region set to 70%, the
property A(samplebuffer ≥ critical) is satisfied if the stop
message cannot be dropped. However, if losing messages
is enabled in the network automaton, the property is not
satisfied.
4. MATLAB / SIMULINK MODELING OF
SYSTEM DYNAMICS
Figure 11 presents the Simulink model of the PCA pump
system. The overall structure of the Simulink model follows
that of the model shown in Figure 2. The Simulink models
are used to capture the dynamics of the PCA infusion pump,
pulse oximeter, patient model, and supervisor, described in
Section 2. They are used to define the notion of the safe,
critical, alarming regions precisely. In addition, using the
overall structures and timing properties of the components,
this section shows when the system is safe and when the
system is not safe. Also, this section describes how to cope
with failures of network while maintaining the safety of the
overall system.
4.1 Simulink Models
Figure 12 presents the Patient ’s model, where effects of
the drug flow are depicted using the drug absorption func-
tion. The Patient Model’s dynamics are modeled as a first-
order continuous system with predefined values for pole and
zero, which is a simplified version of the function presented
in [11]. In addition, its Heart Rate (HR) and SpO2 level
were extracted from the drug level using linear mapping.
We have simulated the Patient ’s behavior when the drug is
repeatedly delivered for 10 minutes followed with 10 min-
utes pause. Figure 13 presents obtained changes in HR and
SpO2 levels.
PO, designed similarly as described in Section 3, monitors
the Patient ’s HR and SpO2 level and informs the Supervisor
about these values. Using the Patient ’s readings we define
three different regions shown in Figure 14 as follows:
• The Safe region is defined as the region where the Pa-
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Figure 12: Patient model in Simulink
tient ’s readings are below some predefined threshold
values that guarantee that Patient ’s vitals are not en-
dangered
• The Critical region where Patient ’s life is in danger or
there is a chance that irreparable damage can occur.
• The Alarming region defined as the region where Pa-
tient ’s vitals are not endangered but there is a rea-
sonable concern that the Patient can be forced to the
Critical region.
4.2 Analysis of System Safety Properties
For the presented system we considered safety require-
ment that the PCA pump will always be stopped before
Patient ’s Critical region is reached. The system will satisfy
the requirement if following condition is met:
tPOdel + tnet + tSup + tnet + tPump + tP2PO + tpi ≤ tcrit (3)
where:
• tPOdel - worst case delay caused by PO: it can be cal-
culated from the PO specification, see Table 2.2,
• tnet - worst case network delay: the value depends on
used network protocol,
• tSup - worst case delay introduced by the Supervisor ’s
procedure: it can be calculated from the Supervisor
model,
• tPump - worst case delay introduced by the PCA pump:
the value can be calculated from the pump model,
• tP2PO - worst case latency from the moment when
command is sent from the PCA pump until the drug
starts (or stops) flowing: it depends on type of con-
nection used,
• tpi - worst case Patient Inertia, a time that elapses be-
fore drug injected in body affects the Patient : it can be
calculated from the pharmacological drug description,
and
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Figure 13: Patient’s response on the pump activities
• tcrit - Patient ’s critical time, a shortest time that Pa-
tient spends in the Alarming region before it enters
Critical region: this parameter can be calculated from
the Patient model as described below.
If Equation 3 is satisfied we can guarantee that the Super-
visor will be able to determine that the Patient have entered
the Alarming zone and stop PCA pump before the Patient
switches from Alarming to the Critical zone. The values for
previously mentioned time constants are shown in Table 4.2.
Here, we want to emphasize that an assumption is used that
the network latency tnet is bounded by 0.5s.
The main problem in determining whether the safety con-
dition is met is to find the value for tcrit. If a mathematical
model for the Patient is known this value can be analyti-
cally determined. In our model, since we modeled the Pa-
tient as a first order continuous system with time constant
α > 0, when the drug flow is on, HR and SpO2 level will
decrease with time as function e−αt. For example, SpO2
level will have the form Cmin + Ae
−αt where Cmin and A
are constants. To calculate tcrit consider t1 and t2, time in-
stances when the Patient enters the Alarming and Critical
regions respectively. If the Patient is continuously pushed
toward the Critical region (which in this case means that the
pump is continuously delivering drug to the Patient) then
tcrit = t2 − t1. Since Hi = Cmin + Ae−αti , i ∈ {1, 2}, tcrit
can be calculated as
tcrit =
1
α
log
H1 − Cmin
H2 − Cmin .
Figure 14: Regions of Patient’s conditions
In our model the time constant α is equal to 0.001s−1
meaning that if the drug flow is stopped the patient’s drug
level will be decreased to half of the initial level in approxi-
mately 11.5 minutes (690s). Thus, tcrit is a couple of orders
of magnitude bigger than sum of all other timing parame-
ters. For H1 = 90% and H2 = 70% (SpO2 levels) and Cmin,
we have tcrit ≈ 1609s ≈ 26.8min. Therefore, our system al-
ways satisfies the safety requirement if the assumption that
all messages are delivered is valid.
time delay value
tPOdel 1s
tnet 0.5s
tSup 0.2s
tPump 0.1s
tP2PO 2s
tpi 10s
Table 3: Worst case delays
If we were given a complex patient model in Simulink,
from which it is not possible to analytically determine tcrit,
in order to obtain it the simulation of the Patient ’s behavior
can be used (see Figure 13). Of course simulation results de-
pend on input signals and model’s initial state, so we assume
that worst-case scenario is known. Otherwise, approaches
similar to one from [12] can be used.
An important question that needs to be addressed is the
consistency between the two models. Since the UPPAAL
model of the controller uses significantly simplified patient
dynamics, there is the possibility that verification results ob-
tained on the UPPAAL model would not apply to the more
detailed model and thus the system itself. An important
consistency check is the value of tcrit, the time it takes for
the patient to be overdosed. In the UPPAAL model, the
value of tcrit may be different (we denote it t
U
crit), but it
has to be no greater than the value obtained above. In our
case, tUcrit turns out to be 20 seconds, an order of magnitude
smaller than tcrit. Clearly, the UPPAAL model overesti-
mates the rate of change for the drug level in the patient
body. And, since the system has been proven safe in this
case, it would also be safe in the more realistic case.
4.3 Failures and Fail-Safe PCA system
We have seen in Section 3 that the system does not satisfy
its safety property if network messages can be lost. Also it
can be noticed from the Equation 3 if any of the delays on the
left side of the equation is significantly increased, the condi-
tion would not be satisfied. Increase in any of the delays can
be caused by a component or network failures, which would
result in an open-loop system. To provide safety assurance,
we have to take into account realistic situations where net-
work failures occur or PO accidentally gets detached from
the Patient. Therefore, Supervisor ’s control algorithm and
PCA pump’s designs have to guarantee the system’s open-
loop stability. For our case study this means that even if the
Supervisor does not receive the right values for HR and/or
SpO2 or the pump does not receive the command to disable
drug flow, we have to guarantee that the patient will not
enter the Critical region. Open-loop stability implies that
even if the patient keeps pressing the button no drug flow
will be enabled if there is a possibility that the amount of
drug inserted can harm the patient.
One way to design the system that complies with the open-
loop stability is to design the pump that receives activation
command from the Supervisor (not the Patient) along with
the duration of the drug flow. When the Patient presses
the button if the Supervisor is informed about current HR
and SpO2 values it can determine duration of the pump’s
activation (Δtsafe) that guarantees the patient’s safety. An
additionally imposed condition is that the Supervisor will
disregard if the button is pressed during tdel units of time
after the pump is stopped. Here, tdel takes into account all
the delays in the loop and is defined as follows:
tdel = tPOdel + tnet + tSup + tnet + tPump + tP2PO + tpi
The imposed condition ensures that the last drug delivery
will take full effect before the next button pressed command
is sent to the Supervisor. In addition, it implies that the drug
level function will reach its local maximum before HR and
SpO2 measurements sent to the Supervisor are obtained.
All constituents of tdel, except the network delay, can be
calculated as described in the previous Section. We assume
that the underlying real-time network provides a guaranteed
bound on the network delay, as described in [5].
To calculate Δtsafe we define following parameters:
• dlcur - last received drug level
• Δdl - worst case increase in drug level due to the sys-
tem latencies while the pump is off
• Δdl(d, Δt) - maximal drug level increase due to drug
flow of the duration Δt when the initial drug level is d
• Hdl2 - Critical region threshold for the drug level
Therefore to satisfy the safety requirement, Δtsafe has to
meet the condition
dlcur + Δdl + Δdl(dlcur, Δtsafe) ≤ Hdl2 (4)
Since a linear dependencies between drug level and HR
and SpO2 measurements is assumed, dlcur can be easily cal-
culated from the latest measurements. Requirement that
after the pump is stopped, the Supervisor will disregard if
the button is pressed for tdel time units, implies that when
the button pressed command is accepted Δdl ≤ 0, since the
drug level will reach its local maximum before the measure-
ments are taken. Thus, the new safety condition can be
obtained from:
Δdl(dlcur, Δtsafe) ≤ Hdl2 − dlcur (5)
Again if mathematical model of the Patient ’s dynamics is
available, Δtsafe can be either analytically or numerically
calculated from the previous condition. In our model, when
the pump is on, the drug level function has form dlmax(1−
e−αt), where dlmax is the maximal (saturation) level for the
drug absorption. Thus Δtsafe can be calculated as
Δtsafe =
1
α
log
dlmax − dlcur
dlmax −Hdl2 (6)
Obviously if dlcur < Hdl1, where Hdl1 is the drug level
Alarming region threshold, Δtsafe will be greater than tcrit.
For example in the Simulink model where dlmax = 100,
Hdl2 = 85.71 and dlcur = 20 < 28.57 = Hdl1 (which
corresponds to H2 = 90% and H1 = 70% for SpO2 Criti-
cal and Alarming regions thresholds respectively) we obtain
Δtsafe ≈ 1723s > tcrit. Similarly if the patient is already in
the Alarming region (dlcur ≥ Hdl1) then Δtsafe ≤ tcrit.
Similarly as for safety condition described in Equation 3,
more complex Simulink Patient model can be used for black-
box testing. In this case after setting the initial condition to
dlcur simulation can be used to determine Δtsafe for each
initial point dlcur.
The described system can guarantee open-loop safety since,
even if some (or all) of the messages are dropped, the patient
would never enter the Critical region. The reason is that the
pump activation command also contains the duration of the
drug flow. If the flow duration is calculated properly, the
pump will stop before safety requirement is breached.
To guarantee open-loop safety we made an assumption
that the Supervisor is able to determine whether received
measurements are valid. This is a reasonable assumption
because modern POs send an invalid code in cases when
probes are detached from the patients body, which is the
main reason why POs do not obtain valid values. Note that
in this work we do not consider failures where components
behavior differs from the behavior described by their models.
For example, if the pump is active longer then requested, or
if PO does not send an invalid code when it is not able to
obtain valid measurements.
Of course the presented solution is not the only way to
guarantee open-loop safety. An alternative approach which
requires minimum change to existing PCA infusion pumps
is to have the Supervisor instruct the pump the maximum
amount of drugs can be injected.
Using current measurements similarly as in Equation 6,
the Supervisor can calculate the maximum allowed drug
dosage as follows:
max drugsafe =
1
α
log
dlmax − dlcur
dlmax −Hdl2 · df,
where df presents the drug flow when the PCA pump is
on. The infusion pump is programmed to inject at most
max drugsafe until the Supervisor sends a revised maximum
allowed dosage. This system is inherently fail-safe since the
worst consequence of failed network, Supervisor, or PO is
no drug injection.
5. RELATED WORK
Formal methods have traditionally been used for verifi-
cation of time-critical and safety-critical embedded systems
[13]. Until recently these methods have not been used for
medical device certification. The authors in [7] presented the
use of Extended Finite State Machines for model checking
of the Computer Automated Resuscitation A medical de-
vice. Formal techniques have also been applied to improve
medical device protocols [14] and safety [15]. However, the
authors either used a simplified patient model or did not
model the patient at all.
Continuous monitoring of the blood oxygenation of pa-
tients receiving PCA infusions has been done in the past
and even commercially implemented. The Alaris 8210 SpO2
Module connects to the Alaris 8000 pump controller and
adds the ability to pause infusions based on a target SpO2.
Our approach shows how a similar system could be designed
and validated. In particular, while the available commercial
system is provided as a tightly-integrated system from a sin-
gle vendor, our approach could be used to design and vali-
date systems based on devices from multiple sources as long
as the timing and other necessary information is available.
6. DISCUSSION
One of the biggest problems in designing physiologically
closed-loop control for medical scenarios is the lack of ap-
propriate plant models (in this case, patient bodies). There
is a vast body of physiological knowledge in the medical lit-
erature. For the PCA scenario, pharmacokinetic models of
drug absorption are known (e.g., [11]), and there is statisti-
cal data on the effects of the drug on vital signs. However,
we are not aware of a unified model that captures the whole
process and is appropriate for the control-theoretic study
of the closed loop dynamics. Constructing such a model
is beyond the scope of this paper but is an important av-
enue of future research. Once an appropriate model is in
place, supervisory adaptive control technqiues [16, 17] can
be used to address parametric uncertainty and adapt to the
continuously fluctuating parameters due to the changes in
the patient condition.
7. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model-driven approach to design and
validate closed-loop medical device systems. The approach
combines simulation-based validation of a continuous-time
system model in Matlab with formal verification of a more
abstract model using timed automata and the UPPAAL
tool. The key to keeping the two models consistent is to
derive timing parameters of the system from the Matlab
model and use these constants in the UPPAAL model.
We offer a case study of the proposed approach using a
clinically relevant system. The dynamics system we use is
relatively simple. This choice is made on purpose, to bet-
ter present the steps in our approach. With more compli-
cated dynamics, some of the steps become more difficult;
in particular, derivation of timing parameters may require
more sophisticated methods and further research may be re-
quired. For the case study, we have shown that the system is
safe under no failure assumptions. We identify how to deal
with some of the failures that manifest as unbounded delays.
The proposed method is based on the well-known notion of
timed lease used in fault-tolerant distributed systems. We
believe that such a technique can be applied to other tightly
integrated medical systems in which fail safe is essential.
Although the presented case study is relatively simple, we
believe that our approach allows us to construct safety cases
for regulatory approval of closed-loop medical systems.
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